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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD W. BRANDT and 
LEONA J. BRANDT, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
SPRINGVILLE BANKING COM-
PANY, a Utah corporation, F. C. 
PACKARD and HOWARD C. MAY-
CO·CK, 
Defenaants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9128 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Come no'v Howard W. Brandt and Leona J. Brandt, 
the above named Plaintiffs and Appellants, and respect-
fully petition the Honorable Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah for rehearing of the appeal, and the decision 
thereon rendered and filed by the court on June 29, 
1960. Said petition is based upon the following points, 
in which the court erred in rendering said decision: 
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POINT I. 
JUS'TICE HENROID ERRED IN HIS CONCURRING 
OPINION IN HOLDING THAT THE S'TATU'TE OF LIMITA-
TIONS, 78-12-26, DCA, 1953, WAS A BAR TO PLAINTIFFS' 
ACTION AND 'THE THEORY ON WHl!CH IT WAS BASED 
AS AGAINS'T DEFENDANTS. 
POINT II. 
THE RECITAL OF FACTS IN SAID PREVAILING 
OPINION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE BASIS FOR 
THE JUDGMENT RENDERED BY YOUR HONORABLE 
.COURT IN SAID ACTION. THAT THE FACTUAL EVI-
DENCE REQUESTED BY AND SUBMITTED TO THE 
LOWER COURT ARE THE ALLEGED FACTS SET FORTH 
IN DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(R. 27), DEFENDANTS' AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPOR'T THERE-
OF (R. 29), PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT (R. 21) 
AND PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT OPPOSING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (R. 36) AND 'THE 
COURT WAS OBLIGATED TO REVIEW SAID FACTUAL 
RECORD IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE 
PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLAN'TS. Morris v. Farnsworth Mo-
tel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P 2d 297. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ER.RED IN HOLDING THA'T THE FACTS 
SHOWN AS TO THE BANK'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
TRANSACTION DID NO•T SUPPORT THE CONTENTION 
THAT A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BE'TWEEN 
THE DEFENDANT BANK OR I'TS OFFICERS, AND THE 
PLAINTIFFS, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH SHOW-
ING A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS WELL 
TAKEN. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFFS CONTEND THAT THE ·CONCEALMENT 
OF MA'TERIAL FAC'TS PERTINENT TO THE TRANSAC-
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TION IN QUES'TION BY THE OFFICERS OF THE DE-
FENDANT BANK DOES NOT HAVE TO BE BASED UPON 
A FIDU·CIARY RELATION TO MAKE THE DEFENDANTS 
LIABLE IN SAID ACTION. 
POIN'T V. 
PLAINTIFFS CONTEND THAT DEFENDANTS ARE 
LEGALLY LIABLE FOR FALSE OR MISSTATEMENTS OF 
FACTS IRRESPE~GTIVE OF THE COURT'S HOLDING THAT 
THE F A~CTUAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW A FIDUCI-
ARY RELATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
POINT VI. 
'THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS 
NO BASIS UPON WHICH IT COULD BE FO·UND THAT 
THE EXISTEN,CE OF THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE HAD 
ANY CONNECTION WITH THE F AlLURE OF THE STOCK-
MAN & FARMERS MART. 
At to Point I, plaintiffs' cause of action is not 
barred by the statute of limitations as set forth in Sec-
tion 78-12-26, Utah 'Code Annotated, 1953. We respect-
fully request your Honorable Court to review this point 
in our Brief, pages 13 and 14, and particularly the case 
of SMITH vs. EDWARDS, 81 Utah 244, 17 P. 2d 265, 
in which the court held : 
"Under the laws of Utah it is clear that the 
limitation does not begin to run until the facts 
constituting the fraud are discovered. There is 
therefore a great deal said in these cases about 
what amounts to discovery. *** The question is, 
what constitutes a 'discovery' within the meaning 
of the statute~ Mere constructive notice of the 
deed by reason of its being filed for record is not 
notice of the facts const~tuting the frawd. ***'' 
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~The allegation in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
that they did not discover or learn of the existence of 
said chattel mortgage until on or about June, 1958 (R. 
22-23) is controlling in absence of any evidence to the 
contrary. 
Subsection (3) of Section 78-12-26 U.C.A. 1953, reads 
as follows: 
"(3) An action for relief on the ground of 
fraud or mistake; but the cause of action in such 
case shall not be deemed to have accrued until 
the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake." 
See annotations under said subdivision (3): 
"4. Subdivision 3 in general. 
"A plea of the statute of limitations is a mat-
ter of affirmative defense, and it is rather un-
usual to require plaintiff to anticipate such a 
defense by allegations in his complant. Nunnelly 
v. First Federal Building & Loan Assn., 107 U. 
347, 154 P. 2d 620, 632, followed in Bennion v. 
First Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 107 U. 381, 
154 p. 2d 634." 
In the Nunnelly case (supra) the plaintiffs allege 
that they did not discover the fraud perpetrated by the 
defendants until 2·~ years before the commencement of 
this action, apparently in anticipation of a plea of the 
statute of limitations. 
"Had the complaint totally failed to include 
any allegation regarding the date of the discovery 
of the fraud it would nevertheless still have stated 
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a cause of action. Statutes of limitations are mat-
ters of repose which can be either raised or 
waived by the defendant. Until it is made to 
appear that the defendant desires to seek repose 
behind a statute of limitations the benefits of 
such a statute will not be given to him. A plea 
of the statute of limitations is a matter of af-
firmative defense and at the outset it might be 
noted that it is rather unusual to require the 
plaintiff to anticipate such a defense by allega-
tions in his complaint. Rather it would seem that 
the complaint could be filed with the assumption 
that no such defense would be interposed. If by 
answer the defendant claimed such affirmative 
defense, the plaintiff could meet such defense 
by his reply. Otherwise, the complaint might be 
burdened with many allegations set forth solely 
for the purpose of anticipating a defense which 
might never be raised. Under this line of reason-
ing no alle·gations regarding the discovery of the 
fraud should logically be needed in the com-
plaint.'' 
As to Points II, III, IV, V and VI of Plaintiffs' 
Petition for Rehearing, we respectfully request your 
Honorable Court to review Point II of Plaintiffs' Brief 
beginning with page 15 thereof and particularly the 
statement of Prosser on Torts, 2d Ed. p. 532-536 (Brief 
21) in which Prosser states: 
"Another exception is found where the par-
ties stand in some confidential or fiJduciJary re-
lation to one another, such as that of principal 
and agent, executor and beneficvary of an esttJ;te, 
bank and investtng depos~tor, or numerous others 
where special trttst and confidence is reposed. 
In addition, certain types of contracts, such as 
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those of suretyship or guaranty, insurance, part-
nership and joint adventure, are recognized as 
creating something in the nature of a confidential 
relation, and hence as requiring the utmost good 
faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material 
facts. 
"*** In a number of recent decisions, how-
ever, the same duty of disclosure has been found 
in other types of transactions where one party 
remains silent as to. a fact which he knows to be 
of importance to the other. The law appears to 
be working toward the ultimate conclus~on that 
full disclosure of .all matertal facts n~ust be made 
whenever elementary fair conduct demands it. 
"When the plaintiff seeks relief of an equit-
able character as by rescission of the transaction 
and recovery of what he has parted with, a more 
liberal rule usually is applied. *** The greater 
liberality found as to such remedies is probably 
due to the fact that they are p,rimarily concerned 
with preventing the defendant from obtaining 
an unfair advantage of his own, while the action 
of deceit requires hm to go further, and compen-
sate the plaintiff for the loss he has sustained." 
Prosser quotes the case of BRASHER v. FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK (1936) 232 Ala 3480, 168 So. 42. 
Also, the case of EDWARD BARRON ESTATE CO. v. 
WOODRUFF ·CO. (1912) 163 Cal. 561, 126 P 351, 42 
LRA NS 125. This latter case cites the following rela-
tionships where special trust and confidence reposed: 
"*** for instance, the relations of trustee 
and cetui que trust, principal and agent, attorney 
and client, physician and patient, priest and 
parishioner, partners, tenants in common, hus-
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band and wife, parent and child, guardian and 
ward, and many others of like charcter.'' 
The following excerpts from the Brasher case are 
pertinent: 
"Where ~a relation of trust and confidence 
ex?Jsts between the pwrties it is the duty of the 
party in whom the confidence is repose~d to make 
/ttll dvsclosure of all material facts within hvs 
knowledge relating to the transact~on in question 
and any concealment of material fact by him is 
a frattd.'' ( 232 Ala. 340 at page 344.) 
12 RCL 311, 45 Am Rep 75, reads: 
"Where confidential or fiduciary relations 
exist, which afford the power and means to one 
party to a transaction to take undue advantage 
of the other party and there is found the slvghtest 
trace of ttndue influence or unfavr advantage, re-
dress will be given to the injured party." 
12 RCL p. 305, par. 66: 
"Fraud may be committed by the suppression 
of truth as well as by the suggestion of falsehood 
and it is equally competent for the court to re-
lieve against it whether it is committed in one 
way or the other. The one acts negatively, the 
other positively; both are calculated, in different 
ways, to produce the same results." 
215 Ala 200, 110 So. 286: 
"Cottrts of Justice will not look for naked 
technicalities and mere sentimental~sm as to 
shield one who by h~s fraud and deceit inflicts 
damage on another." 
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The following statement is contained in paragraph 
two on the second page of the prevailing opinion : 
"In dealing with the above contentiJon, it 
should first be observed that under the facts 
shown as to the bank's involvement ~n the tr.ans-
action, we see no basis to support t.he content~on 
that a fiduciJary relationship existed between Vt, 
or vts officers, and the plaintiffs." 
This statement is not sustained by the factual 
evidence and the law as shown by the quotations from 
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence 5th Ed. Vol. 3, as 
hereinafter set forth. 
Plaintiffs contend the undisputed factual evidence 
before your Honorable Court shows a fiduciary rela-
tionship between the parties. Howard C. ~{aycock, cash-
ier of the defendant bank, testified in his deposition 
as follows: (R. 42-43 - Brief 7) 
"Q. .Are you acqainted with Mr. Howard W. 
Brandt? 
".A. I am. 
"Q. When did you first become acquainted with 
him? 
".A. .At the time he purchased his home in 
Springville. 
"Q. Do you know when that was~ 
"A. I would be guessing, but sometime around 
1949, I think. 
"Q. Then for at least approximately 10 years 
or 9 years you have been acquainted with 
Mr. Brandt~ 
".A. That is right. 
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"Q. What has been the nature of your acquaint-
ance with him~ 
"A. The fact that he has been a customer of the 
bank, a depositor havilng a check~1ng account 
there ~and also in connect~on with church 
affavrs. I happen to be his ward teacher." 
(spiritual advisor) 
Howard W. Brandt testified in his Affidavit Op-
posing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as 
follows: 
"That plaintiffs and their family have been 
patrons and depositors of the Springv~lle Bank-
~ng Company from approximately 1949 to ap-
proximately 1958; that during said time plaintvffs 
were personal friends of s,aid defendants F. C. 
Packard and Howard C. Maycock, President and 
Cash~er respecttvely of said Springville B~anking 
Company; that many t~mes durivng sa~d peri,od 
plaint~ffs have consulted with said offvcers of 
s~a~d bank on financial matters pertaining to theiff 
personal affairs." 
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS 
MADE O~N PLEADINGS AND AFFIDAVITS. DE-
TAILED EVIDENCE INCIDENT TO TRIAL T·ESTI-
1\IONY IS NOT BEFORE US. PLAINTIFF:S' PLEAD-
INGS AND AFFIDAVIT OPPOSING SAID MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE REPLETE 
WITH FACTUAL EVIDEN·CE THAT A FIDUCIARY 
RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN THE PAR-
TIE.S. 
PLAINTIFFS FURTHER CONTEND THAT 
EVEN IF YOUR HONORABLE COURT HOLDS 
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THAT THERE WAS NO FID·UCIARY RELATION 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES, THE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED. 
POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE Vol. 3, 5th 
Ed. 
Par. 956a. CASES TO WHICH PRINCI-
PLE EXTENDS-Courts of equity have care-
fully refrained from defining the particular 
instances of fiduciary relations in such a manner 
that other and perhaps new cases might be ex-
cluded. It is settled by an overwhelming weight 
of authority that the p-rinciple extends to every 
possible case in which a fiduciary relation exists 
as a fact, in which there is confdence reposed on 
one side, and the resulting superiority and in-
fluence on the other. The relation and the dwtres 
involved in it need not be legal; it mOI!J be moral, 
social, domestic, or merely personal. (If a rela-
tion of trust and conf~dence exists between the 
partves - tha.t iJs to say, where conf~dence is 
reposed by one party and a trust accepted by 
the other, or where confidence has been acquired 
.and abused - that is sufficiJent as a predvcate~ 
for relief. The origin of the conf~dence is im-
1nateral.) 
Par. 902. "WHEN DUTY TO DIS·CLOSE 
EXISTS-Concealment becomes fraudulent only 
when it is the duty of the party having knowledge 
of the facts to discover them to the other (see 
par. 901) ; and this brings back the question, 
When does such duty rest upon either party to 
any transaction~ All the instances in which the 
dtt,ty exiJsts, and in w hi~ch a concealment is there-
fore fraudttlent, may be reduce~d to three distiYnct 
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classes. These three clases are, in general, clearly 
distinct and separate, although the~r boundaries 
rnay sometimes overlap, or a case may fall within 
two of them: 
"1. The first class includes all those in-
stances in which, wholly independent of the form, 
nature, or object of the contract or other trans-
action, there is a previous, existing, definite fi-
duciary relation between the parties, so that the 
obligation of perfect good faith and of complete 
disclosure always arises from the existing rela-
tions of trust and confidence, and is necessarily 
impressed upon any transaction which takes place 
between such persons. Familiar examples are· 
contracts and other transactions between a princi-
pal and agent, a client and attorney, a beneficiary 
and trustee, a ward and guardian, and the like. 
"2. The second class embraces those in-
stances in which there is no existing spec~al fi-
dttcixory relation between the parties, and the 
transaction is not in its essentrol nature f~duc~ary, 
but it appears that either one or each of the 
parties, in entering into the contract or other 
transaction, expressly reposes a trust and con-
fidence in the other; or else from the circum-
stances of the case, the nature of their dealings, 
or their position towards each other, such a trust 
and confidence in the particular case is necessar-
ily implied. The nature of the transaction is not 
the test in this class. Each case must depend upon 
its o\vn circumstances. The trust and confidence, 
and the consequent duty to disclose, may express-
ly appear by the very language of the parties, 
or they may be necessarily implied from their 
acts and other circumstances. 
"3. The third class includes those instances 
where there is no exvsting fiduciary relatvon be-
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tween the parties, and no special confidence re-
posed is expressed by their words o·r impliJed from 
their acts, but the very contract or other trans-
action itself, in its essential nature, i;s intr~nsi~­
cally fiduciary, and necessarily calls for perfect 
good fa~th and full disclosure, without regMd to 
any p~articular intention of t.he part~es." 
As to Point VI, the court erred in holding that there 
was no basis upon 'vhich it could be found that the exist-
ence of the chattel mortgage had any connection with 
the failure of the Stockman & Farmers Mart. 
1\fAY WE EMPHASIZE THAT THIS MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGl\iENT IS NOT· PREDI-
CATED ON EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE TRIAL 
OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED. 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment must be 
based upon defendants' affidavit in support of said 
motion, plaintiffs' complaint and plaintiffs' affidavit 
opposing said motion for summary judgment. 
The ultimate fact which is important is clearly 
stated in plaintiffs' complaint (R. 23) "that as a proxi-
mate result of said chattel mortgage and concealment 
thereof by defendants, plaint~jfs lost said $10,000." 
Our code of civil procedure does not require a liti-
gant to set forth trial evidence in opposing a motion for 
summary judgment. Ultimate facts are properly pleaded. 
Factual evidence in support thereof are usually reserved 
for the lower court at the trial of the issues. Evidence 
may be included in an affidavit opposing a motion for 
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sun1mary judgment, as was done by the plaintiffs in 
'vhich part of the deposition of Howard ·C. Maycock, 
ea~hier of the defendant bank, was made a part of 
plaintiffs' affidavit (R. 41). This evidence clearly estab-
lished the false statement of defendant Maycock that 
the only encumbrance against the assets transferred 
to the Stoclanan & Farmers Mart was $6,500 owing to 
the creditors of the Jackson Sales & Service Co. This 
evidence dvsclosed a posvtive misrepresentation which 
should be carefully reviewed in connection with defend-
ants undisputed concealment of material facts. (See 
R. 41-44.) 
The prevailing opinion indicates that the chattel 
n1ortgage had nothing to do with the business going 
broke. That the real estate mortgage and the chattel 
mortgage referred to were satisfied and discharged by 
conveyance to the bank of real estate by Waldo Jackson 
and his company. In support of this statement defend-
ants in their brief cite the affidavit of defendant Howard 
C. 1\Iaycock (R. 30). 
There is not a sctntilla of evidence before your 
Honorable Court as to when th~s mortg,age debt was 
discharged. Plaintvffs evidence at the trial would show 
it was years after the tnsolvency of the Stockman & 
Farnzers Mart that this debt was discharged by W~aldo 
Jackson or the Jackson Sales & Servvce Company by 
virtue of a real estate transaction on out-of-state prop-
erty. THIS IS A GOOD ILLUSTRATION OF THE 
FALLACY OF ACCEPTING A HALF TRUTH IN 
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SUPPO~RT OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT. SUCH QUESTIONS ARE FOR THE TRIAL 
JURY. 
Prosser on Torts, 2nd Ed. p. 566-671: 
"Damages: 
*** The better view is that damage is not 
essential to restitution, in equity or at law, but 
that it is merely one factor to be cons~dered in 
determining whether equitable relief should be 
granted." 
* * * 
"Furthermore, the damage upon which a 
deceit action rests must have been 'proximately 
caused' by the misrepresentation. So far as the 
fact of causatvon is concerned, any loss w·hvch 
follows upon a transaction ~nto whix:h the mis-
stiatement induces the pla~ntiff to enter may be 
sa~d to be cause,d by it; ***" 
"*** It seems correct to say rather that dam-
age is not essentml to rescission, but that it is 
merely one factor to be considered ~n determinimg 
whether ~t is equitable to allow the trramsact~on 
to stand." 
Prosser quotes Restatement of the Law of ·Con-
tracts, par. 476 (c) which reads as follows: 
"No legal effect is caused by either fraudu-
lent or other misrepresentation unless it induces 
affirmative or negative conduct, but ~t is not 
necessary that misrepresentation should be the 
only inducement for enter£ng ilnto a contract or 
for giving a discharge, voidable. It is enough 
that the mvsrepresentation is relied on as an 
mducement. It is immaterial whether damage is 
caused." 
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Am Jur Vol. 23, par. 175, p. 994: 
"ONE WHO IS DEFRAUDED THROUGH 
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS RESPECTING 
THE SOLVEN·CY OF ANOTHER IS DAMNI-
FIED AS SOON AS HE IS INDUCED TO ACT 
IN THE MANNER OCCASIONING THE LOSS, 
AND MAY MAINTAIN AN ACTION THERE-
FOR AT O·NCE.'' (See cases cited.) 
·Certainly a person of ordinary experience would 
conclude that the misconduct of defendants resulted in 
the insolvency of the said corporation and the damage 
to plaintiffs in the sum of $10,000. In the first place, the 
proposed corporation was to have an unencumbered 
inventory of stock and equipment of the reasonable 
value of approximately $26,500. As a matter of fact 
there "\vas a chattel mortgage outstanding against these 
assets in the sum of $45,000 with an unpaid balance of 
$41,194.79. According to the misrepresentations of the 
defendants, these assets were free and clear of encum-
brances except the sum of $6,500, which sum said cor-
poration borrowed from the defendant bank to discharge 
obligations of creditors of Jackson Sales & Service Co. 
Defendant Maycock test~fied th~s $6,500 was the total 
obligations against these assets, R. 41-43. , Thvs was a 
nzaliciously false statement as there was an outstandi·ng 
mortgage indebtedness of some $41,194.79. From these 
facts .any ordtt"nary person tvould say that the company 
1cas insolvent from its very imceptiJon. The Defendant 
Maycock also testified that the $10,000 which plaintiffs 
u.:ere putting into the business was to pay for their 
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stock in the corporation; that this would give the cor-
poration $10,000 in cap~tal to operate the company. May-
cock testif~ed: "'We felt an additional $10,000 in the 
business would make it a better business and ~t would 
also gve a new personality to it.'' (R. 42) 'THIS STATE-
MENT IS ALSO FALSE. UNDER THE CONSPIR-
ACY OF THE DEFENDANT·S, THE $10,000 WAS 
TRANSFERRED IMMEDIATELY ON THE DATE 
OF ITS RE.CEPTION TO THE DEFENDANT BANK. 
There was also ~a statement made by Defendant Maycock 
that $10,000 was being put into the bus~"ness by Waldo 
Jackson. These representations were all made when this 
corporati·on was finally bro~tght into being on March 2, 
1955. This statement was false as shown by the sworn 
testimony of Waldo Jackson in his deposition as here-
inabove set forth. (R. 47-48) So instead of having a capi-
ta)l of $20,000 thiJs comp:any had absolutely no capital 
at all, as the $6,500 which they borrowed was solely for 
the purpose of discharging obligations of the creditors 
of J~ackson Sales & Service Co. The facts show that this 
amount was paid to these creditors. From the beginning 
this corporation has $26,500 of stock and equipment 
subject to a mortgage indebtedness of $41,194.79 and 
note of $6,500 owing to defendant Springville Banking 
Co. Certainly no one would loan any money for working 
capital on assets whieh were encumbered with liens far 
in excess of their value. Is it any wonder that on or 
about May of 1955 approximately two months after the 
organi,zation of this corporation the defendants put the 
pressure on Waldo Jackson and plaintiffs to sell the 
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inventory and assets of the Stockman & Farmers M·art 
in order that the $6,500 oblvgation to the bank could 
be liquidated. Finally on or about September of 1955 
at the instance and demand of defendants, Stockman & 
Farmers Mart did exchange its assets for a farm at 
Payson, Utah, owned by one E. A. Sm~thurst, which 
far1n was subject to a mortgage in the ap·proximate 
sum of $6,751.23. The facts show that defendant bank 
presided through this Smithurst transaction. Then to 
complete the financial cap~tulation of this comp;any, the 
defendants demanded that the farm be sold to John T. 
Mart~n and after the mortgage was paid on the farm, 
the net proceeds of $4,300 wa.s paid to s.aid defendant 
bank upon said $6,500 loan. Applying Prosser's test of 
causatvon, no sane person could possibly arrive .at any 
conchtsiDn other than that the misconduct of the .de-
fen.dants was not only a basic cause of the tnsolvency 
of the Stockman & Farmers Mart, but was the basic 
oause of sa~d insolvency. Certatnly the misconduct of 
defendants was clearly and definitely a b.asic cause and 
in the opinion of any reasonable person the basic cause 
of the damage suffered by plaimtvffs in the sum of 
$10,000. 
The case of HOTALING vs. A. B. LEACH ·CO. 
(1928) 247 NY 84, 159 NE 870 lays down the rule "that 
the loss proximately c.ause~d by defendants' fraud is the 
difference between the prvce he paid and the value of 
what he recet~ed when put to the use contemplated by 
the parties." If the representations by defendants had 
been true and the Stockman & Farmers Mart had en-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
joyed the capital structure incident to these represen-
tations, the dire consequences that befell this corpora-
tion would never have occurred and plaintiffs would 
not have suffered damages in the sum of $10,000 or any 
other sum. 
Furthermore, no sane person would have invested 
$10,000 in such an enterprise if defendants had disclosed 
to plaintiffs that defendant bank had a $41,194.79 mort-
gage encumbrance against the total inventory assets 
of $26,500 and especially if such investor had been in-
formed that D·efendant Maycock's statement, that there 
were only $6,500 encumbrances against said assets, was 
false. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McCULLOUGH, BOY·c·E & 
McCULLOUGH 
By: R. Verne McCullough 
Attorneys for AppelZants 
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